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amount of the counterclaim.8 3 This solution would not only bring
uniformity to the treatment of such counterclaims but would also
serve the interest of efficient litigation by allowing all the rights and
liabilities of the parties to be determined in a single suit in the dis-
trict court.
JERRY M. TRAmMELL
Habeas Corpus-Waiver of Constitutional Guarantees
In Stem v. Turner' the appellant, a prisoner, appealed the denial
of habeas corpus relief by a federal district court. The district judge
after a thorough review of most of the records of the appellant's
trial in a North Carolina state court and of his attempts at state
post-conviction relief, refused to grant a plenary hearing and dis-
missed the writ. The district court found as to some of Stem's
allegations that the findings of facts in state hearings were correct
and concluded as to other allegations that the appellant had failed to
exhaust his state remedy under the post-conviction statute. The
Court of Appeals for the 4th Circuit interpreted a section of the
North Carolina Post-Conviction Acte such that the appellant's state
remedy had been exhausted and as a result the appellant was en-
titled to a plenary hearing in a federal district court.
In November of 1958, Thomas Stem was convicted in a North
Carolina court of assault on a female with intent to rape and sen-
tenced to a term of fifteen years. At his trial the two arresting
police officers introduced illegally obtained evidence and testimony
that was extremely prejudicial to him.3 Stem's privately retained
" It appears that such a provision should allow the litigation of permis-
sive as well as compulsory counterclaims. Where neither claim requires a
long and complicated trial, apparently there would be no unreasonable de-
lay. If a long or complicated trial be anticipated the court can always in
"futherance of convenience" order separate trials. FED. R. Civ. P. 42(b).
1370 F.2d 895 (4th Cir. 1966).
'N.C. GEN. STAT. § 15-218 (Supp. 1965).
'Stem was arrested without a warrant at his home. No search was made
of the house at that time, but the police officers returned to the house later
that afternoon to search it. Nowhere in the record did it appear that the
officers had a search warrant, or that Stem had consented to the search. As
a result of the search, the officers found the girl's underpants which were
introduced into evidence, made certain observations they testified about at
the trial, and took photographs of parts of the house. All of this illegally
obtained evidence corroborated the story of the girl. 370 F.2d at 898.
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counsel failed to object to the evidence and testimony even though
North Carolina law renders evidence obtained by an illegal search
incompetent.4 The conviction was not appealed, but Stem did assert
many times in several forums various legal improprieties that sup-
posedly occurred in his trial.5 All of these were denied, including
attempts under the state post-conviction relief statute and under a
writ of habeas corpus to state courts. At this point, the appellant
sought a writ of habeas corpus from the -United States District
Court for the Eastern District of North Carolina which was also
denied.
In seeking a writ of habeas corpus from the federal courts, Stem
asserted many grounds, but the one which eventually found favor
with the court of appeals was ineffectiveness of counsel amounting
to a deprivation of due process under the fourteenth amendment.6
The district judge had concluded that this issue, although formally
raised in the pleadings, had not been asserted with proof to sustain
it in any state court proceeding and, therefore, the appellant had
failed to exhaust the remedy still available to him under the North
Carolina Post-Conviction Hearing Act.7 However, the acte seem-
ingly provides to the contrary that "any claims of substantial denial
of constitutional rights or of other error remediable under this arti-
'N.C. GEN. STAT. § 15-27 (1953). The prohibition against the use of
evidence obtained as a result of an illegal search extends to "facts dis-
covered or evidence obtained" by reason of the search. The federal court
presumed that this would bar testimony concerning observations made dur-
ing the search. Stem v. Turner, 370 F.2d 895, 898 (4th Cir. 1966).
' Stem v. Turner, 370 F.2d 895 (4th Cir. 1966) gives a history of the
case.
A pro se petition for certiorari to review the conviction was denied
by the North Carolina Supreme Court on Nov. 21, 1961. Represented
by privately retained counsel, appellant then sought, and was denied,
relief under the North Carolina Post-Conviction Hearing Act (N.C.
G.S. §§ 15-217 et seq.), after he was given a plenary hearing. A
petition for writ of certiorari to the North Carolina Supreme Court to
review that denial was denied Nov. 26, 1963, and a petition for a
writ of certiorari was thereafter denied by the Supreme Court of the
United States. Stem v. North Carolina, 379 U.S. 849 (1964). Next,
a pro se petition for a writ of habeas corpus was denied by Wake
County (North Carolina) Superior Court on April 15, 1965, and
certiorari to the North Carolina Supreme Court denied June 2, 1965.
Id. at 896 n.2.
8 Stem's main contention centered on the failure of his privately re-
tained counsel to object to evidence that resulted from the illegal search.
Id. at 900.
Id. at 897.8 N.C. GEN. STAT. §§ 15-217 to -222 (Supp. 1965).
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cle not raised or set forth in the original or any amendment petition
shall be deemed waived."9 Despite the literal language of the statute,
the Attorney General of North Carolina argued that the state trial
courts followed the practice of considering claims that were not
raised or decided in previous applications. However, the court of
appeals noted that the North Carolina Supreme Court had not had
occasion to speak definitely on the subject and that absent a definite
state adjudication to the contrary, the professed language of the
statute must prevail over asserted trial court practice.1- Since claims
by Stem could no longer be heard under the Post-Conviction Hearing
Act, he had exhausted his state remedies, but since Stem had not
waived his constitutional claims under the federal standard, he was
entitled to a plenary hearing in the federal district court to establish
his claim to a writ of habeas corpus.
The development of the writ of habeas corpus in this country
has been one of growing importance.1" Due in part to currently
expanding concepts of due process of law, the use of the writ to test
the constitutionality of state criminal proceedings will continue to
accelerate.1 2 However, in order to maintain a balance between the
state and federal court systems, Congress has declared that federal
courts should abstain from exercising jurisdiction over state prison-
ers until state remedies have been exhausted.'3
In 1963, the Supreme Court of the United States decided the fa-
'N.C. GEN. STAT. § 15-218 (Supp. 1865).
" 370 F.2d at 897.
"The Judiciary Act of Feb. 5, 1867, ch. 28, § 1, 14 Stat. 385, first ex-
tended federal habeas corpus to state prisoners generally. The history and
development is reviewed in detail in Fay v. Noia, 372 U.S. 391, 415 (1963).
2 The number of habeas corpus applications filed in federal district courts
by state prisoners is greatly increasing:
1941-127
1950-560
1955-660
1959-828
DIR. OF ADMIN. OFFICE OF UNITED STATES COURT, 1959 ANN. REP. 109.
1962-1115
1963-1903
1964-3531
1965-4664
DIR. OF ADMIN. OFFICE OF UNITED STATES COURT, 1965 ANN. REP. 118.
1 28 U.S.C. § 2254 (1964) provides that:
the habeas corpus writ will not be granted for a state court unless it
appears that the applicant has exhausted remedies available in the
courts of the state. Remedies are not exhausted in state courts if the
applicant has a right under the law of the state to raise by any avail-
able procedure, the question presented.
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mous trilogy of Fay v. Noia,'4 Townsend v. Sain," and Sanders v.
United States,'6 which laid down certain federal standards for deal-
ing with habeas corpus. In Townsend v. Sain, the court attempted to
redefine the guidelines as to when a petitioner tried in a state court is
entitled to an evidentiary hearing in a federal district court. The
Court said:
Where the facts are in dispute, the federal court in habeas corpus
must hold an evidentiary hearing if the habeas applicant did not
receive a full and fair evidentiary hearing in a state court, either
at the time of the trial or in a collateral proceeding. In other
words a federal evidentiary hearing is required unless the state-
Court trier of fact has after a full hearing reliably found the
relevant facts.' 7
The court set out six specific situations in which an evidentiary
hearing would be mandatory under the test, including the case where
"the merits of the factual dispute were not resolved in the state
hearing.'1 8
In Fay v. Noia the Court laid down certain federal standards
relating to the problem of exhaustion and waiver of state remedies.
The court held that procedural defaults incurred by the applicant
during the state court proceedings would not bar federal habeas
corpus relief as a failure to exhaust state court remedies, unless the
state remedies were knowingly waived. The requirement of exhaus-
tion of state court remedies was interpreted to mean those state
court remedies still available to the applicant at the time an applica-
tion for habeas corpus was filed in federal court. The federal habeas
judge was given some discretion in denying relief to an applicant
who had deliberately by-passed state court procedure and in doing
so had forfeited his state court remedies. But the Supreme Court
plainly stated that the forfeiture must meet the federal standards
of waiver, for waiver affecting federal rights is a federal question.'"
The Townsend and Noia decisions outline the possible results
14372 U.S. 391 (1963).
' 372 U.S. 293 (1963).
373 U.S. 1 (1963). See 42. N.C.L. REv. 352 (1964) for a discussion
of all three cases.
17 372 U.S. at 312.81d. at 313.
'9 See Johnson v. Zerbt, 304 U.S. 458 (1938). The case gives the classic
definition of waiver as an intentional relinquishment or abandonment of a
known right or privilege.
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when a state court prisoner seeks habeas corpus relief before a fed-
eral court:
1. If there has been a full hearing in the state court on the merits
on the issue for which relief is sought in the federal court, the state
court prisoner is not entitled to relief whether there has been a
waiver or not.
2. If there has not been a full hearing in a state court on the merits,
but the prisoner has knowingly waived his state court remedies, then
the state court prisoner is not entitled to relief in the federal court.
3. If, however, there has not been a full hearing on the merits in
the state court and there has been no waiver of state court remedies
that meets federal standards, the prisoner is entitled to a hearing in
the federal courts.
This last situation is applicable to Stem v. Turner.2 Stem's
claim for relief based on ineffectiveness of counsel had not been
considered on the merits by a North Carolina hearing, but was
barred by state procedure, a waiver that did not meet the federal
standards.
In McNeil v. North Carolina,2 the court of appeals over-
ruled the same district court judge involved in the Stem case.
The appellant was seeking habeas corpus relief due to the systematic
exclusion of Negroes from his jury, and as in the Stem case the
conflict between the federal standard of waiver and the North Caro-
lina standard resulted in the assumption of habeas corpus jurisdic-
tion by the federal courts. North Carolina case law holds that any
objection to a jury not raised prior to the entry of the plea shall
deemed waived, and the North Carolina post-conviction statutes
state that any claim not raised in the original petition shall be deemed
waived.22 Since this does not meet the federal standard of waiver
of a constitutional protection, the federal district court was directed
to grant the requested writ.
The Supreme Court has made it clear that the doctrine of comity
is not going to prevent the federal courts from using the writ of
habeas corpus to protect the federal rights of state prisoners. Fed-
370 F.2d at 895.
"368 F.2d 313 (4th Cir. 1966).
" See, e.g., State v. Lowry, 263 N.C. 536, 139 S.E.2d 870 (1965) ; State
v. Wilson, 262 N.C. 419, 137 S.E.2d 109 (1964): State v. Inman, 260 N.C.311, 132 S.E.2d 613 (1963); State v. Covington, 258 N.C. 495, 128 S.E.2d
822 (1962).
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eral standards are to be applied in such areas as waiver, and state
procedural defaults will not bar later applications for federal habeas
corpus relief. There was much criticism of the Court from various
sources for these decisions. Justices Clark and Harlan wrote vigor-
ous dissenting opinions to Fay v. Noia, attacking the new federal
standards as abrupt departures from the Constitution and past de-
cisions.' There was a fear that the delicate balance between state
and federal courts would be destroyed,24 and that the federal courts
would be swamped with habeas corpus applications having an ad-
verse effect upon the disposition of meritorious applications.2 5
In Case v. Nebraska 0 the court attempted to answer some of its
critics by placing responsibility on the states to adopt broad post-
conviction relief statutes in order to minimize the necessity of state
prisoners resorting to federal habeas corpus. Justice Brennan in a
concurring opinion stated that:
Our federal system entrusts the states with primary responsibility
for the administration of their criminal laws. The Fourteenth
Amendment and Supremacy clause make requirements of fair
and just procedures an integral part of those laws, and state
procedures should ideally include adequate administration of
these guarantees as well. If, by effective corrective processes,
the States assumed this burden, the exhaustion requirement of
28 U.S.C. § 2254 (1958 ed.) would clearly promote state primacy
in the implementation of these guarantees. Of greater impor-
tance, it would assure not only that meritorious claims would
generally be vindicated without any need for federal courts inter-
vention, but that nonmeritorious claims would be fully ventilated,
making easier the task of the federal judge if the state prisoner
pursued his cause further .... Greater finality would inevitably
attach to state court determinations of federal constitutional ques-
tions, because further evidentiary hearings on federal habeas
corpus would, if conditions of Townsend v. Sain were met, prove
unnecessay 27
The Supreme Court has clearly put the states on notice that the
maintenance of the balance between state and federal court systems
22 372 U.S. at 445 (Clark, J., dissenting).
24 See, e.g., Desmond, Federal and State Habeas Corpus, 49 A.B.A.J.
1166 (1963).
-25372 U.S. at 445 (Clark, J., dissenting).
28381 U.S. 336 (1965) (per curiam with Clark, J. and Brennan, J. con-
curring in separate opinions).
"Id. at 345 (Brennan, J., concurring).
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is now in the hands of the states. The growing protections that the
Court's interpretation of the Constitution affords to state prisoners
demands that the states reform their systems in order to comply with
the federal standards. If the state systems are not reformed in such
areas as right to counsel, discrimination in jury selection and use of
coerced confessions there will be a continued friction between fed-
eral and state courts and an increasing flood of applications for
federal habeas corpus.'
Justice Clark in his concurring opinion in Case v. Nebraska,
cited North Carolina as one of the seven states to lead in providing
modern post-conviction relief procedure for testing federal claims
in the state courts.2' But North Carolina has failed to go far eonugh
in complying with federal standards.
The Supreme Court has indicated "that at some point in the
criminal process, a convicted person will get a full evidentiary hear-
ing on the merits of every federal right he asserts" and "if the
prisoner has had no adequate hearing in the state court he will surely
get one in the federal courts."3 Justice Brennan in Case v. Nebras-
ka31 suggested certain desirable attributes that a state post-convic-
tion procedure should have. He felt that "it should be sufficiently
comprehensive to embrace all federal constitutional claims" and "in
light of Fay v. Noia it should eschew rigid and technical doctrines
"6 Dean Griswold of Harvard Law School in an address, "The States and
Criminal Law," given on May 13, 1965, to the Cleveland Bar Association,
said:
For, after all, the basic responsibility for the enforcement of the
criminal law remains in the States. The States are, or should be, as
much concerned with high standards as is the Federal government.
The States should, in my view, welcome the determinations of the
Supreme Court that the high standards prescribed by our Federal
Constitution are to be taken seriously and should be enforced. What
is needed now is for the States to accept this responsibility and to
adopt means to carry it out. With proper explanation and under-
standing, this can, I believe, be done without impairing our enforce-
ment of the criminal law. When the States do fully meet this re-
sponsibility, we will all be better off, and we will more nearly have
realized the potentialities of our Great Federal Form of Government.
Case v. Nebraska, 381 U.S. 336, 344 n.7 (1965). See, e.g., Brennan, Some
Aspects of Federalism, 39 N.Y.U.L. Rnv. 945, 957-59 (1964).
20 381 U.S. at 340.
Meador, Accommodating State Crimitai Procedure and Federal Post-
conviction Reviews, 50 A.B.A.J. 928, 929 (1964). See White v. Swenson,
261 F. Supp. 42 (W.D. Mo. 1966).J1381 U.S. 336 (1965).
of forfeiture, waiver, or default. '82 Professor Meador of the Uni-
versity of Virginia Law School has stated:
The federal habeas corpus judge will not now be foreclosed by
a state procedural waiver. The federal judge will examine the
alleged waiver himself and will give it effect only if it amounts
to a deliberate by-passing of state procedure, as explained by
Noia. This means that if the states hope to terminate a substan-
tial portion of their criminal business in their own courts, the
states may not invoke any doctrine of waiver more stringent than
this federal concept. The Noia definition of an effective waiver
promises to pose one of the most troublesome aspects of Supreme
Court trilogy. Whatever, we think of it, however, we should
understand its consequences and make decisions about state pro-
cedure accordingly.83
North Carolina deserves praise in its liberal post-conviction hear-
ing statute, but the Stem and McNeil cases have shown that the
federal courts will not be bound by the statute's language concern-
ing waiver.8 4 Counsel from the North Carolina Attorney General's
office stated in both cases that in spite of the language of the post-
conviction statute, North Carolina courts would hear subsequent peti-
tions raising issues available at the time a previous petition was
filed. 5 But the court of appeals felt bound by the stated language
of the statute.30 North Carolina in order to bring its statute in line
with actual state practice and federal standards, should amend N.C.
GEN. STAT. § 15-218 (Supp. 1965) to allow subsequent petitions
for post-conviction hearings dealing with claimed denials of consti-
tutional rights that have not been knowingly and deliberately waived
by the petitioner, and that have not previously been heard on the
merits. In other words, North Carolina should adopt the federal
standard of waiver in the post-conviction relief statute. This would
add finally to North Carolina state court litigation by allowing the
North Carolina courts to make final dispositions of a larger propor-
tion of its criminal cases and eliminate for the federal courts a
potential burden of serious proportions.
GEORGE V. HANNA III
"
2Id. at 346-47.
" Meador, 50 A.B.A.J. 928, 929-30 (1964).
" See note 9 supra and accompanying text.
" Stem v. Turner, 370 F.2d 895, 897 (4th Cir. 1966). McNeil v. North
Carolina, 368 F.2d 313, 316 (4th Cir. 1966).
30 370 F.2d at 897.
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